Abstract: This paper shows how a Markovian tax policy can optimally address a flow externality associated with resource extraction when the policymaker faces asymmetric information. In the model I consider, the policymaker must set policy in each period before the realization of a price shock. Resource owners then learn the value of the shock, and the owners choose extraction quantities. The optimal policy responds to a positive shock to the current price by reducing next period's tax rate. Intuitively, a reduction in next period's tax rate makes extraction next period cheaper and thus dampens the resource owner's c current response to a price increase. A quota policy cannot similarly attain the optimal path in this setting because quotas limit the resource owner's ability to respond to new information. This result suggests that taxes may strictly dominate quotas in similar dynamic settings.
models make sequences of static decisions while the policymakers maximize welfare over the infinite horizon. In another paper, Weitzman (2002) investigates the optimal regulation of a competitive fishery where the stock of fish evolves subject to uncertainty. This also amounts to a dynamic social problem over a sequence of static, private decisions. Private agents in this model do not link current and future fishing decisions because of the open access problem: since individual agents do not have property rights to the remaining fish, agents simply harvest fish up to the point where price equals marginal cost in each period.
Resource extraction, however, presents private agents with a fundamentally dynamic problem. The contribution of this paper relative to the prior literature is thus a comparison of price and quantity policies when both the private and social problems are dynamic. Analogous problems arise when Pigouvian taxes or quotas affect firms who face capital investment or research and development decisions. The results of this analysis may therefore inform policy comparisons for these problems as well.
The main result of this paper is that a stationary tax policy can induce resource owners to remain on the socially optimal extraction path despite informational asymmetry. The optimal tax policy under asymmetry works by making sure that future taxes adjust to account both for the present and future changes in marginal external damages (MED) that arise from private decisions.
Since private agents care about profits over the infinite horizon, rather than just profits in a single period, changes in future tax policy can induce socially optimal choices in the present.
1 Analysis here shows that the socially optimal policy requires that future tax rates fall in response to 1 Similar results apply in other contexts. Kocherlakota and Basseto (2004) (KB) offer a similar intuition for why government debt level is irrelevant under distortionary taxes. The common thread between this paper and KB is that policy can achieve its aims because private agents with property rights facing dynamic problems maximize present value. The contribution of this paper relative to KB is to show how this principle applies to instrument choice.
positive, current price shocks. Quantity instruments do not admit such a design, however, because no change to next period's quota can induce agents to respond to positive shocks with increases in current extraction, which social optimality requires.
I proceed to show these results in the next five sections. The first section begins by describing the economic environment and analyzing a representative non-renewable resource owner's extraction problem with future price uncertainty. Section II examines how the resource owner adjusts extraction to comply with a quantity policy, which the model generically represents as an extraction quota in each period. The optimal response condition for the quantity instrument translates easily into an analytic description of the owner's response to a price instrument, which the model takes to be a tax per unit of extraction. I make use of these response functions in Section III when I solve the social planner's problem. In Section IV, I analyze the policymaker's problem under asymmetric information. Assuming an economy with commitment, I construct the optimal tax policy and then prove quotas cannot attain the firstbest. I provide further insight into the optimal policy with a comparative statics analysis. The paper concludes with a summary and questions for further research.
I. A Model of Non-renewable Resource Extraction Under Price Uncertainty
In keeping with the timing convention of Weitzman (1974) , I assume that the policymaker must announce policy before uncertainty is resolved in each period. I assume extraction yields a flow externality to represent pollution from private "production". Where Weitzman (1974) focuses on additive shocks to the marginal costs of abatement, I choose to work with shocks to the resource price because natural resources like gold and oil have volatile price series. From an economic point of view, price shocks do represent shocks to marginal abatement costs in cases where reducing extraction is a form of abatement. In a static model, these assumptions would thus fit precisely into the framework Weitzman (1974) considers.
To focus on how the dynamic component of the resource extraction problem affects the relative desirability of taxes and quotas, I limit my attention to an economic environment populated by a large number of homogeneous, price-taking resource owners. Each resource owner employs an extant extraction process to recover a known, fixed level of homogeneous reserves.
This formulation of the owners' optimization problem puts distributional concerns aside and allows a single agent to represent a competitive non-renewable resource market.
2 By these assumptions, this paper ignores several important facets of non-renewable resource problems:
human-made capital investment, resource exploration, ore quality, and backstop technologies. As long as policymakers and resource owners have the same information over these complicating factors, the main results of this paper remain intact. Additional sources of informational asymmetry, however, may affect the findings. At the conclusion of this paper, I return to these assumptions and consider their importance to future research.
To simplify the presentation of the model, I adopt a compact notation common to dynamic programming theory. On the cost side, assume extraction has costs given by the function C ( x ), where C ( x ) is increasing, continuous, twice differentiable, and strictly convex. 5 Let C (0) = 0 and dc dx (0) = 0.
Represent the value of any asset in the next period in current terms by applying the discount factor β = (1 + r ) -1 , where r > 0 is the risk-free rate of return. The optimizing representative owner chooses the extraction path that will maximize the value of the non-renewable resource over the infinite horizon. Thus, the owner faces a standard "cake-eating" problem that can be described by the value function
3 The results of this paper continue to hold if expected prices evolve according to some exogenous sequence {p t } t=0 ! known to both the policymaker and the resource owners. 4 Shocks are chosen to have mean zero to reflect the absence of bias in agents' expectations. The assumption of independently and identically distributed shocks eases the exposition of the model, but is not necessary to the existence of an optimal sequence and does not otherwise change the results of the model. 5 The results of this paper do not change when costs depend on the stock of the resource.
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The assumptions above imply that the current period profit function ( p + !) " x # C(x) is strictly concave; that the value function has a non-empty, compact-valued state-transition correspondence; and that β is less than one. Standard dynamic programming theory therefore
shows that a solution to this problem exists, and that the value function V is twice differentiable and strictly concave. The following first order condition describes the optimal choice of x as the extraction quantity that equates the marginal net benefit and the marginal opportunity cost of extraction, which is the marginal change in the value of the remaining resource stock:
Because ε has mean zero, and the current realizations of ε do not give information on future realizations, the envelope theorem implies
along the optimal extraction path. Equation (3) expresses a Hotelling (1931) rule, which states that the optimizing resource owner follows an extraction plan where the royalty-price less marginal cost-grows at the rate of interest.
When following this extraction path, the resource owner responds to positive price shocks by increasing extraction. Intuitively, a rise in prices implies a greater marginal benefit to extraction, justifying a greater marginal opportunity cost. To obtain this result mathematically, view the optimal extraction x as an implicit function of the state variables: x = x ( S, ε ) . Under the assumptions of this paper, dynamic programming theory shows that x is well-defined and continuous. The first order condition (2) is a level function of x ( S, ε ) since it is always zero along the optimal path. Using the implicit function theorem, differentiate the first order condition (2) with respect to ε and solve for !x !" to find that
Since C is convex and V is concave, the denominator in (4) is strictly positive and therefore
The remainder of this paper builds on this model by analyzing its implications for optimal policy when extraction has an associated flow externality. In keeping with the "prices vs.
quantities" literature, I represent quantity policies by a quota and price policies by a per-unit tax. 6 To lay the groundwork for the policy problem, the paper first addresses how the representative resource owner responds to policies that aim to curb pollution. I then specify a social planner's problem that takes these private responses into account when solving for optimal policy with symmetric information. The main problem this paper considers then comes into focus: can policymakers achieve this first-best when they must set policy before prices are realized, and when owners choose extraction levels?
II. Policy and Extraction Response
To begin, suppose that quantity and price policies depend on variables outside the control of any individual resource owner, such as the aggregate resource stock. From the perspective of an individual resource owner, given any such quota q > 0 , the resource owner facing a series of price shocks as described in Section I now solves
where ! " 0 is the shadow price of the quota-the marginal cost to the resource owner from not extracting the next unit of the resource in the current period. 7 The optimal extraction rule that solves (5) then has the form
This rule again reflects the Hotelling logic, but includes the impact of the quota on royalties.
Consider the resource owner's extraction function x q ( S, ε , q) under the quota q. When the resource owner does not expect the policy to bind in either period, λ = E [ ! " ]= 0 and the resource owner's behaves exactly as the unconstrained policy function x ( S, ε ) . Likewise, if the expected policy binds in both periods, λ > 0 and E[ ! " ]> 0 and the resource owner sets x q ( S, ε , q)= q . Finally, if the resource owner expects the policy to bind next period but not in the current period, the resource owner responds to higher costs in the future by increasing extraction in the present by choosing some extraction x = x q ( S, ε , q): x > x ( S, ε ) .
In comparison, consider the resource owner's response to a per unit tax. From a resource owner's perspective, given any tax τ per unit extracted the owner's problem has the form
To guarantee a non-zero optimal extraction choice, assume that the net price is always positive,
i.e. ∀τ and ε , p + ε -τ > 0 . The optimal extraction rule for this problem grows the expected royalty p + ! " dC dx (x) " # according to the Hotelling rule:
Under these assumptions, it is easy to show that the optimal extraction function under a per-unit tax, x τ ( S, ε ,τ ) , is positive, continuous, and increasing in S and ε .
III. The Social Planner's Problem
If resource extraction yields an externality, the unconstrained private extraction policy of Section I is not socially efficient. To contrast the private resource owner's choices with the socially optimal policy, I now turn to the formulation and solution of a social planner's problem under symmetric information. I impose symmetry by supposing that both the planner and the representative owner know the value of ε in the current period, and that neither know the value of future realizations of ε . Thus, the planner still faces some uncertainty, but the representative owner faces that same uncertainty.
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Consider a partial equilibrium economy where a flow externality with damages f (x) arises for x units of resource extracted by resource owners. 9 Assume f (x) is twice differentiable and strictly convex with f (0) = 0, df dx (0) = 0, and df dx (x) > 0 ∀x > 0. Suppose that the private discount rate equals the social discount rate, and that the planner has perfect information on the representative owner's cost function. 10 By assumption, resource owners are homogenous and do not face a common pool problem, so the social problem may be written in terms of a representative agent.
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For parsimony, suppose that the resource owner can only abate pollution by reducing extraction. This modeling choice implies that taxes on extraction equate to taxes on pollution.
The results I derive based on this assumption can be generalized to models with abatement choices and taxes on pollution, provided that abatement capital levels determine abatement labor levels, or that labor levels follow a dynamic rule. I discuss this assumption in light of my results at the end of the paper.
Taking into account the external damages from extraction, the planner maximizes welfare:
where x R and S R respectively denote the representative agent's extraction and resource stock.
Assuming that marginal social royalty to extraction is always positive, i.e.
, the optimal plan will always set x R > 0. The first order condition for this problem is
Applying the envelope theorem to (10) yields the first-best policy rule:
Let x SO and ! x SO denote the socially optimal extraction policies that satisfy (12). Note that
: the first-best depends on the representative agent's stock S R and the realization of the price shock.
This extraction rule has the same form as the resource owner's, but it also takes into account the MED of extraction both in the current period and in the future. As in the resource owner's solution, unexpected price increases in the current period warrant increased extraction from the planner's perspective. The same intuition applies, as well: because marginal benefits rise, the optimum must occur where marginal costs are also higher. The following comparative static result bears this logic out:
, which is strictly positive along the socially optimal path since the functions C and f are strictly convex and W is strictly concave in X. (See Appendix A. for the derivation of !x SO !" ). A quick comparison of (12) and (4) also shows that
. Because of external damages, the social planner responds to a positive price shock with a smaller increase in extraction than a private resource owner would choose.
IV. Attaining the First-best Under Asymmetric Information
Now consider a welfare-maximizing policymaker with asymmetric information: policy must be chosen before ε is realized. The first-best result that (11) describes suggests that such a policy cannot attain the optimum because the representative owner's allocation x SO depends on ε . Nonetheless, in an economy with commitment, a stationary tax policy can attain the firstbest. A similar quota policy, it turns out, cannot.
To see this result, consider a problem where the policymaker maximizes social welfare subject to the constraint that individual resource owners choose optimal extraction levels. The tax rate each period must be chosen before the realization of ε , but tax rates in the future may depend on past realizations. If a stationary tax policy exists that can induce the first-best, it must align the resource owner's optimal private extraction policy as described by (8) with the first-best as described by (11) so that the following must hold:
In other words, individually optimizing resource owners facing the tax policy must choose the 14 socially optimal path.
Solving this condition for τ and ! " yields a feasible, stationary policy rule that must induce the first-best by construction. Substituting for ! S R using the transition equation
This result shows that along the socially optimal path, it isn't the level of taxes that matters so much as the real difference between the current tax rate and next period's tax rate. In fact, this difference depends only on ε and the representative agent's resource stock. Since ε is exogenous and N is large, no individual resource owner can affect the right hand side of (14).
Thus, for all τ , S R , and ε there exists a ! " such that individually optimizing resource owners in this setting choose the socially optimal level of extraction.
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Quotas cannot be similarly designed to achieve the first-best. In general, quotas fail to attain the optimal path because they do not allow private agents to make full use of information they have that the policymaker does not. A quota policy that adjusts next period's quota in response does not do any better. Suppose, for example, that the quota in the current period binds. If the realization of ε is greater than 0, then (12) shows that it must be socially optimal to increase extraction beyond the current quota. No change in next period's quota, however, can induce optimal behavior, because the current quota binds.
The formal proof of this idea turns on the same fact: quotas limit private choices. Consider a quota policy in the spirit of (14), where the shadow prices of the quotas are chosen so that individually optimizing resource owners choose the socially optimal extraction level. If such a policy exists, it must satisfy
The shadow prices λ and ! " arise from constraints on the private resource owners decision set.
The question, then, is whether the socially optimal choice x SO (S R ,!) lies within the resource owner's feasible set given the quota. If it does not, then the quota policy cannot induce the social optimum.
The only way that the policymaker can guarantee that the quota policy can permit the optimal choice in the current period, no matter what the realization of ε , is to set an initial quota level that does not limit resource owners at all in the present. Thus, it must be that λ = 0.
Simple updating shows that this logic must hold in the next period as well: the only way to guarantee feasibility of the optimal choice next period is to set ! " = 0 as well. Yet, if λ = 0, then the policy condition given by (15) implies
If df dx > 0, as assumed, (16) implies ! " > 0 , so next period's quota must bind-a contradiction.
Therefore, no quota policy exists that can induce the first-best.
Returning to the optimal tax policy, a comparative statics analysis show that the optimal policy reduces next period's tax rate in response to positive price shocks in the current period. A positive price shock makes an extraction increase both privately and socially desirable, but the social planner would increase extraction less than the resource owner because of external costs.
Reducing next period's tax rate makes extracting next period relatively more attractive to the private owner. The optimal policy thereby dampens private responses to price shocks to ensure the optimizing owner chooses the first-best path.
Mathematically, this result can be derived as follows. For any τ , S R , and ε , differentiation of the optimal tax policy described by (15) yields:
(See Appendix B for proof). Since f is strictly convex and !x SO !" > 0 by (12), it follows that ! " # !$ < 0. The intuition behind equation (17) is straightforward: as ε increases, MED increase beyond the current tax rate. To induce agents to respond correctly to the current rise in MED, the policy reduces next period's tax rate precisely by the change in the present value next period of MED along the optimal path.
V. Conclusions and Further Questions for Research
This paper shows how a stationary tax policy can optimally address a flow externality associated with resource extraction when the policymaker faces asymmetric information in the short run. Quotas cannot attain the optimum because they limit the resource owner's ability to respond to new information. The general idea in this paper is to employ a rule that uses future tax rates as a policy instrument to face private agents with the correct level of external costs. In this particular setting, the optimal policy reduces future taxes as prices rise. The tax rate reduction gives resource owners an incentive to save resources for later extraction, thereby reducing extraction in the current period.
This intuition points to a key assumption of this paper. The policy solution derived in this paper works precisely because changes in future taxes on extraction imply changes in opportunity costs and changes in the present discounted value of the resource stock. But this assumption does not hold in some important cases. Consider a model where resource owners could employ a static factor, like labor, to reduce pollution. In a nutshell, the policy fails in such scenarios because, for purely static factors, current levels do not affect future levels. Neither the future tax rates on such factors nor the future marginal abatement they provide would appear in the resource owner's first-order conditions. The resource owners would not care about changes in future tax rates on static factors because current levels would not represent an investment in future levels of these factors. Even if the first best cannot be attained by policy in such models, however, it might be possible to compare how welfare losses evolve for price and quantity instruments.
Another important assumption made in this paper is that the informational asymmetry in this model, though persistent, is short run in nature. The policymaker learns the value of the current shock at some point in the future and can therefore incorporate information on realizations of current uncertainty into future policy. If the asymmetry were instead permanent, so that policymakers never learned the value of the shock, a dynamic game might arise where policymakers would attempt to extract information from agents' observable decisions. If an equilibrium exists where the policymaker can identify past values of the shock, then a strategy that implements the first best via a price instrument may also exist.
It also seems worth considering how other forms of short run uncertainty affect this problem.
For non-renewable resource extraction in particular, policymakers may face uncertainty over the resource owner's capital stock, the quality of ore extracted, and the price of the backstop technology. While an optimal tax sequence seems plausible for any one of these cases individually, how do prices and quantities compare when multiple sources of asymmetric information arise in a dynamic setting? Any source of uncertainty that implies a corner solution to the agents' problem may affect the optimality of taxes, but it may be possible to use such corner solutions in much the same way as Weitzman (2002) Solving for !x SO !" algebraically now yields
which is equation (12) . / 0 1 2 3 .
After applying the transition equation ! X R = X R " x SO (X R ,#) to express terms more simply, basic arithmetic yields
The expectation operator in (iii) is over ! " , not ε , so the derivative !x SO !" may be moved outside the expectation to obtain
Substitution for !x SO !" using into (12) yields 
After obtaining a common denominator for all terms, (B5) can be rewritten as
First, note that (B9)
Differentiating once more and substituting using the transition equation, (B9) implies
But note that by the envelope theorem (twice applied) that:
